A NEW PLATFORM FOR THE NEXT WAR
Russian Slava-class guided-missile cruiser Moskva in the Mediterranean Sea, December 17, 2015.Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP
On March 9, 1862, the Union warship Monitor met its Confederate counterpart, Virginia. After a four-hour exchange of fire, the two fought to a draw. It was the first battle of ironclads. In one day, every wooden ship of the line of every naval power became immediately obsolete.
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. If the battle of the ironclads settled once and for all the wood-versus-iron debate, Japanese carrier-based aircraft settled the battleship-versus-carrier debate by sinking the cream of America’s battleship fleet in a single morning.
On April 14, 2022, the Ukrainians sank the Russian cruiser Moskva with a pair of Neptune anti-ship missiles. And that success posed an urgent question to the world’s major militaries: Has another age of warfare just begun? After 20 years spent fighting the post-9/11 wars, the United States military’s attention is again focused on a peer-level adversary. The Pentagon hasn’t been thinking this way since the Cold War, and it is attempting a profound transformation. Today, fierce debate attends this transformation, and nowhere more acutely than in the Marine Corps.
US Navy Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam in the South China Sea.Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Marcus L. Stanley/U.S. Navy via AP, File
The US Navy is trying to retire all of its guided-missile cruisers by 2027.
US cruisers are specialized for air defense and are among the best-armed naval ships in service.
Lawmakers are dismayed by the Navy plan, believing it will reduce US firepower as China's navy grows.
In April, the US Navy presented an ambitious plan to decommission all 22 of its Ticonderoga-class cruisers by 2027.
The move is not surprising. The Navy has tried to rid itself of its cruisers for years, but Congress has consistently rejected its proposals, largely out of concern that decommissioning them would take away a much-needed weapon as China's naval force continues to grow.
With the retirement of the last battleships nearly 20 years ago, cruisers are the largest surface combatants — a category that generally doesn't include aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships — in service.
Cruisers remain among the best armed and most powerful ships in the few navies that employ them, and decommissioning the Ticonderogas would take the US out of that small and very well-armed club.
The Ticonderoga-class
Guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens fires SM-2 missiles during an exercise in the Pacific Ocean, September 20, 2012.REUTERS/Paul Kelly/U.S. Navy photo
Twenty-seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers were built between 1980 and 1994. They have an extensive service history, with high-profile operations all over the world. The 567-foot ships displace about 10,000 tons, and they are the US Navy's most heavily armed surface combatants.
Two Mk 41 Vertical Launching Systems, each with 61 cells, can carry up to 122 missiles. Two Mk-141 missile launchers can carry up to eight more missiles. Ticonderogas are also equipped with two Mark 45 5-inch guns, two Phalanx close-in weapon systems, and two triple-tubed Mark 32 torpedo tubes.
They can be armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Evolved Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles, and vertical-launch anti-submarine missiles, as well as anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missiles.
Guided-missile cruiser USS Vicksburg escorts aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt through the Strait of Gibraltar, March 31, 2015.US Navy/MCS Seaman Anthony Hopkins II
Their large and diverse arsenal allows Ticonderogas to fill multiple rules, including air-defense, anti-ship anti-submarine warfare, and land-attack strikes. They primarily serve as air-defense escorts in carrier strike groups, as they have the most robust air-defense capability in the surface fleet.
They were also the first ships to be equipped with the Aegis Combat System, which uses computers and radars to track hostile forces and guide friendly fire toward incoming threats.
Because of the Ticonderogas' status and armament, their stand-alone deployments are usually meant to convey a message, as with USS Port Royal's transit of the Taiwan Strait in May.
The Kirovs and Slavas
Soviet nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser Kirov, December 22, 1989.US Navy/PH1 Davis
The Russian Navy fields two types of cruisers. The most well-known and feared are the Kirov-class, four of which were built between 1974 and 1998.
Classified as "battlecruisers" because of their heavy armament, the Kirovs are 827 feet long and displace about 28,000 tons. Their nuclear propulsion gives them range limited only by the crew's endurance and their supplies.
Designed to destroy American carrier groups, their primary armament are 20 P-700 supersonic anti-ship missiles, each capable of carrying a 1,600-pound high-explosive warhead or a nuclear one. Kirovs also carry 136 surface-to-air missiles and six close-in weapon systems, as well as one double-barreled 130mm gun, 10 torpedo tubes, and two anti-submarine rocket launchers.
Only two Kirov-class battlecruisers, Pyotr Velikiy and Admiral Nakhimov, remain in service. Pyotr Velikiy is the flagship of the powerful Northern Fleet, while Admiral Nakhimov has been undergoing modernization since 1999, though Russian officials say it will delivered this year.
Russian Slava-class guided-missile cruiser Moskva in the Mediterranean Sea, December 17, 2015.Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP
Nakhimov's upgrades will allow it to fire Kalibr and Onyx cruise missiles and new anti-submarine weapons, and carry Pantsir-M air-defense systems. Russian officials also claim Nakhimov will be armed with Zircon hypersonic missiles in the future.
In 1976, the Soviets laid down the first of three Slava-class guided-missile cruisers.
At 611 feet long and displacing about 11,000 tons, the Slavas are armed with 16 P-500 cruise missiles in eight distinctive dual launchers on either side of the ship. Each P-500 can carry a 2,000-pound conventional warhead or a nuclear one. Some Slavas have reportedly been armed with more modern P-1000 anti-ship missiles.
Slava-class cruisers also carry 96 surface-to-air missiles, a twin-barreled 130mm gun, six close-in weapon systems, two anti-submarine rocket launchers, and 10 torpedo tubes.
Only two Slava-class cruisers, Marshal Ustinov and Varyag, remain in active service. Marshal Ustinov is assigned to the Northern Fleet and Varyag is the Pacific Fleet flagship. Moskva, the lead ship of the class, was the Black Sea Fleet flagship until it was sunk by Ukrainian anti-ship missiles in April.
The 'destroyers'
Chinese Type 055 guided-missile destroyer Nanchang during Joint Sea-2021, China and Russia's first joint naval patrol, in the Western Pacific on October 19, 2021.Sun Zifa/China News Service via Getty Images
Two countries field warships they designate as destroyers but the US and naval experts classify as cruisers because of their size, displacement, and armament.
China's Type 055, known as the Renhai-class, is the most notable. The International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank has said it "may be the most capable multi-role surface combatant currently at sea."
At 590 feet long and displacing over 12,000 tons, Type 055s are armed with 112 VLS cells capable of launching surface-to-air missiles, anti-submarine missiles, anti-ship missiles, and land-attack cruise missiles. They also carry a 130mm gun and a close-in weapons system.
China tested a hypersonic missile aboard a Type 055 earlier this year, and in the future the ships may be armed with anti-ship ballistic missiles designed to kill carriers.
Type 055s are equipped with Type-346A active electronically scanned array radars, a more modern and accurate radar than the passive phased-array radar aboard Ticonderoga-class ships.
ROKS Sejong the Great off the coast of Hawaii during Rim of the Pacific 2010 exercises, July 7, 2010.US Navy/MCS1 Brandon Raile
Eight Type 055s have been built and launched since 2014. At least five have been commissioned and two more are believed to be under construction. Their deployment is already seen as a show of strength — they have been spotted near Japan and Alaska — and they may be a central part of China's future carrier battlegroups.
South Korea's Sejong the Great-class destroyers are also classified by others as cruisers. Three are in active service, each 544 feet long and displacing over 10,600 tons.
Each Sejong the Great-class ship has 128 VLS cells and 16 anti-ship missile launchers in four quad mounts. They are Aegis-equipped and provide early warning of incoming ballistic missiles.
South Korea plans to build three more Sejong the Great-class ships that will have only 88 VLS cells but will be equipped with SM-6 missiles that Seoul plans to buy, allowing them to intercept ballistic missiles.
'Divest to invest'
US Navy guided-missile cruiser USS Vicksburg, April 2, 2009.US Navy/PO2 Class Jesse Dick
The US Navy wants to shed the Ticonderogas — including USS Vicksburg, which is in the middle of a $200 million refit — as part of a broader "divest to invest" strategy to free up resources for newer and more advanced vessels.
While lawmakers and others worry that doing so will leave Navy shorthanded against China, Navy officials argue the cruisers, all of which are over 30 years old, are approaching the ends of their service lives, have outdated electronics, and will cost too much to maintain or refit. Some are even unsafe to operate, Navy officials say.
"They're eating us alive in terms of our ability to get maintenance back on track," Adm. Mike Gilday, chief of naval operations, said in March. "We are paying tens of millions of dollars beyond what we expected to because of growth work and new work on ships that are beyond their service life."
The Navy proposed retiring five cruisers in 2023. In budget documents released this month, the House Armed Services Committee would only allow four retirements and block that of USS Vicksburg, which is one of the youngest of the five on the chopping block, a committee aide told reporters.
In March 2020, the Marine commandant, General David Berger, published “Force Design 2030.” This controversial paper announced a significant restructuring based on the belief that “the Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment.” That “future operating environment” is an imagined war with China in the South Pacific—but in many ways, that hypothetical conflict resembles the real war in Ukraine.
The military we have—an army built around tanks, a navy built around ships, and an air force built around planes, all of which are technologically advanced and astronomically expensive—is platform-centric. So far, in Ukraine, the signature land weapon hasn’t been a tank but an anti-tank missile: the Javelin. The signature air weapon hasn’t been an aircraft, but an anti-air missile: the Stinger. And as the sinking of the Moskva showed, the signature maritime weapon hasn’t been a ship but an anti-ship missile: the Neptune.
Berger believes a new age of war is upon us. In “Force Design 2030,” he puts the following sentence in bold: “We must acknowledge the impacts of proliferated precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart weapons, and seek innovative ways to overcome these threat capabilities.” The weapons General Berger refers to include the same family of anti-platform weapons Ukrainians are using to incinerate Russian tanks, shoot down Russian helicopters, and sink Russian warships. The successes against a platform-centric Russian Goliath by an anti-platform-centric Ukrainian David have elicited cheers in the West, but what we are witnessing in Ukraine may well be a prelude to the besting of our own American Goliath.
Design and Construction of Flying Aircraft Carriers Powered by a massless energy storage to increase strength and regidity along the whole body and wings of the flying aircraft carrier.
My design of a huge flying aircraft carrier with SWARMS of ‘Gremlin' drones will be
capable of launching swarms of drones from mid-air.The huge aircraft will quickly release armies of drones to assault enemy targets before returning to dock with their flying mothership. The length of the flight deck shall be no less than 600 feet to accommodate 4 F35 and 3 SB1 attack helicopters. considering the amount of volume located at the wings of a Blended Wing Body (BWB) design, missiles magazines can be stored there and fuel also. Underneath the flight deck is a hangar accessible by 2 elevators.
Carbon fibre planes: Lighter and stronger by design
Similar shape BWB plane burns 20 per cent less fuel than conventional aircraft and can carry more than 300 passengers
- 'Flying-V' was developed by the Delft Technical University in the Netherlands and KLM is funding the design
- It has the same wingspan as existing planes and is named after the iconic Gibson Flying-V electric guitar
- The aircraft would be able to carry up to 314 passengers in the V-shaped layout of the craft its designers claim
- Passenger cabin, cargo hold and fuel tanks to be integrated in the design which uses 20 per cent less fuel
Like its Russian counterpart, the American military has long been built around platforms. To pivot away from a platform-centric view of warfare is both a cultural challenge—what does it mean to be a fighter pilot without a jet, a tanker without a tank, or a sailor without a ship?—and a resource challenge. It asks the U.S. military, as well as the U.S. defense industry, to divest itself of legacy capabilities like, for example, a $13 billion Ford-class aircraft carrier, in order to invest in new, potentially less profitable technologies like, say, $6,000 Switchblade drones that can kill tanks.
To discount Krulak’s views would be a mistake. His tenure as commandant ushered in significant innovations for the Corps. He laid the intellectual groundwork that allowed the Corps to fight in the post-9/11 world. He also acquired the V-22 for the Marine Corps, a first-of-its-kind tilt-rotor aircraft that is both a plane and a helicopter. Berger’s strategic vision is also the first of its kind; in the event of a war with China, it imagines a 21st-century island-hopping campaign in which bands of 60 to 70 highly trained, lethally equipped Marines would infiltrate onto islands in the South Pacific to target the Chinese navy with advanced missile systems and other long-range weapons. The war at sea, in Berger’s vision, would be decided by a slew of Moskva-like engagements.
Berger’s critics don’t buy it. “The assumption that Marines can get on contested islands without being detected and conduct resupply missions is unrealistic,” Krulak said. “Plus, you’re underestimating the capability of the Chinese. The belief that these forces will shoot and scoot counts on Marines moving faster than a Chinese missile flies. You’re going to lose Marines and be unable to evacuate our wounded and dead. The Navy won’t sail in to get our wounded.”
Admiral James Stavridis, who spent much of his 40-plus-year Navy career in the South China Sea, is a believer in Berger’s vision. “The Army of tomorrow will look like the Marine Corps of today,” Stavridis told me. “What General Berger is doing is critical.” A truism among Marines is that the Corps must be at its most ready when America is at its least. In the 1930s, the Marine Corps pioneered the amphibious doctrine that would pave the way not only for the island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific but also the amphibious landings that allowed the Army to liberate Europe. Innovation, according to Stavridis, remains a core Marine mission.
The debate in the Marine Corps is more profound than the internecine politics of one service branch; it’s a debate about which form of warfare will dominate in the next decades of the 21st century, a platform-centric one or an anti-platform-centric one. Historical precedent abounds for these types of debates. Before the First World War, in the opening years of the 20th century, many militaries adhered to the cult of the offense, a then-stale belief that well-trained, determined troops would always carry the day over a defending force. In the Napoleonic Wars 100 years before, this had often proved true. But up against the 20th century’s breech-loading rifles and machine guns, the offense had become the weaker form of warfare. Tragically, it took the Marne, the Somme, and countless other bayonet charges into the teeth of chattering machine guns for the generals of that era to accept that their understanding of warfare was dated.
Representative Seth Moulton, a former Marine and Iraq War veteran who sits on the House Armed Services Committee, believes that today’s dissenting generals are failing to comprehend how much technology is changing the battlefield and how quickly the services must adapt. “When you look at what weapons are on top of the Ukrainians’ wish list,” Moulton told me, “it isn’t towed howitzers. Top of their list are armed drones, anti-tank missiles, and anti-ship missiles.”
But what if Berger is wrong? What if his “divest to invest” strategy winds up overinvesting the Marine Corps in a highly specific vision of warfare that never comes to pass? According to Moulton, much of this comes down to the role the Marine Corps has traditionally played as an incubator for new ideas as the smallest, nimblest of the services. “Our country can afford to have the Marine Corps overinvested in a new type of warfare that never comes to pass,” Moulton explained. “What our country cannot afford is to have the Marine Corps underinvested in a new type of warfare that does come to pass.”Events in Ukraine seem to validate Berger’s anti-platform-centric view of warfare, in much the same way that World War I validated those who had argued that defense had become stronger than offense. Of course, no form of warfare maintains primacy forever. Krulak made this point as we finished our conversation. “We need to be careful we don’t learn the wrong lessons from Ukraine. You have a great measure. The next thing you know they come up with a countermeasure. So you come up with a counter-countermeasure.”One of the most famous countermeasures developed after the end of the First World War was France’s Maginot Line, a physical shrine to the primacy of defense. What the French failed to account for was that in two short decades, certain developments—more advanced tanks, aircraft, and combined-arms doctrine—had once again swung the balance, allowing offense to reassume its role as the dominant form of warfare. The result was a German blitzkrieg in June 1940 that simply maneuvered around the Maginot Line.
The wager that Berger and the Marine Corps are making is that anti-platform systems won’t be an American Maginot Line, but the best way to save a generation of Americans from their own Somme or Moskva.
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